Is the Christian Ethic Heteronomous?
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It has

been popular of late to charge
Christian ethics with heteronomy. Many
modems tell us that since the norm for the
Christian life is the will of God, and since
to be a Christian means to be obedient to
divine
commands
which
one
receives
an
external
revelation, then the
through
servitude that the Christian must have to
this outer authority denies autonomy on his
part, and makes him heteronomous. This
servitude to outer authority is mirrored,
they tell us further, in the Christian's em
phasis upon the necessity for faith.
In such a reading of Christianity there
is both truth and error. It is true that the
Christian ethos is grounded in a religious
premise. The basis of Christian ethics is
the will of God. The Christian, therefore,
is utterly different from that type of man
who wishes to free himself from all out
ward norms, create his own laws and

values, and have, as his only responsibil
ities, faithfulness to himself. The Christian
follows Christ in making the basis of his
ethics to be religious postulates. Without
faith in God, and without the assurance
that God is the ultimate meaning of the
universe rather than man, the Christian's
ethical ideal would be without support.
But does the fact that Christian morality
is theocentric logically imply that it is a
heteronomous ethic? Yes, if God is con
as
terms
Neo-Reformation
"Wholly Other." If God and man are
thought to be totally distinct from each
other in their essential natures, and the
will of God alone is the norm for man's
actions, then there can be no such thing

ceived

as

in

autonomy

the part of man. Despite
attempt of the Neo-Reforma
on

the energetic
tion theologians of our day to give men
of psychological auton
some semblance
omy and freedom, the fact is that they
have left him with neither. Such has been

Jr.

the result of their false disjunction of God
and man.
However, if one rejects this dualism as
a false assumption and accepts man's moral
capacities as a divine gift, rather than as
one's own creation, then God's will is not
something distinct (or even separate)
from, and alien to, human nature. God's
will then is not an outward command of
power which demands blind, unreflective
obedience apart from the coerciveness one
places on his own act. This is strongly
implied in the Christian doctrine of Cre
ation. Here man is said to have been made
in the image of God. Whatever effect the
"Fall" had on man, the coming of Christ
and the doctrine of the atonement insures
the "renewal" of the image, and the validity
of the above.
Even

though it were true that man and
God were totally distinct from each other
in their essential natures, it still would not
carry through that man had no part in his
moral decisions. Whether the will of God

be

or
subjectively communi
man with such
reached
has
cated,
clarity that he is always certain of his
knowledge of the divine will, or sure of
that which he ought to do in the given
circumstances of life. There are no ex
ternal credentials accompanying the divine
will today which guarantee its divine ori
gin. Ultimately, its divine origin can only
be determined by an appeal to the "en
lightened conscience" of the Christian.
Our necessary uncertainty demands some
degree of autonomy on our part. Auton
omy is also demanded in the application of
moral laws to the everyday decisions of
practical life.

objectively
it

never

If it has been found that the Christian

ethos is not

bound to be heteron
omous, can it be said that it is not so prac
tically? At this point it must be admitted

logically
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that the

reverence

many
an external

now

charge of heteronomy applies to
practicing Christians. Theirs is only
obedience,

a

of external laws which

mere

can

acceptance
be true

never

morality. An act is moral only when it is
freely willed by the one doing the acting.
True morality can never be based exclu
sively on the will of anyone else, even
though the other be God. Hence, as it per
tains

to

the

actual

"average" Christians,

motivation

of

the

of heter

charge

many

onomy is both deserved and serious.

It is deserved because there

are

many-

too-many Christians who need to be stirred
out of their decadence, stodginess, com

placency,
tians

are

and inertia.

That many Chris
what Nietzsche called "herd-men"

cannot be denied.

They

are

content to let

others think for them, decide for them,
and will do all possible to avoid conflict
and escape from

itless, submissive,
need to learn to

living. They

are

the

and the decadent.

spir
They

judge for themselves

and

themselves

more

than

they

are

doing.

It is

because such a
moral person.
person
He violates the primary purpose behind the
free moral agency of man. The moral law
must be jg//-imposed and the moral act be
comes such only when it has one's own
approval. The Christian thinks of his
duties as divine commands, but not as com
mands which he does not accept on his
behalf.
own
Christian morahty, then,
should be found not in an external and imcritically accepted divine will, but in one's
own inner moral nature as created of God,
and hence as subject to the divine will. The
comprehension of the minutiae of the di
vine requirements in the given concrete
moral

a

serious

can

never

charge

become

a

situation demands continuous and
reverent attention to the principles of the
biblical ethic. This attention grows out of
the recognition and acceptance of both
present and ultimate responsibility to God.
From within these limits the valid Chris
tian moral autonomy emerges.

